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Maintaining sufficient levels of competition ranks among the core interests of any national – and increasingly 
international – antitrust policy; however, the formal proof that a cartel really functioned economically and did not only 
exist in a legal sense is hard to deliver: market power is not identical to the existence of a legal cartel unless the 
monopolistic frontier is reached; the legal proof of a cartel does not imply that the market was harmed. From an 
economic point of view, focusing on legal proof of a cartel is fruitless unless collusion resulted in excess profits or 
excess revenues. This economic evidence, however, rests empirically on the proper definition of comparable markets, 
and a sound statistical methodology.  
When in spring 2003, the German Antitrust Agency (GAA) fined the German cement industry € 661 million for having 
established quotas in each of the four market regions through the end of 2001, the legal issue seemed beyond doubt as, 
beside formal inquiries, two of the industry members had acted as key witnesses. However, the economic implications 
drawn by the GAA remain doubtful. In this paper, we use the quota agreement in the East German market, the region 
for which these allegations are undisputed by all major suppliers, as a reference case. We challenge the GAA’s 
computation of excess income of 10 €/ton on two grounds: (i), the comparative market period chosen, 2002, does not 
meet the requirements of a reference market, especially regarding a certain level of stability and converging prices; (ii) 
three parallel developments could have triggered the price decline: the openly announced end of the quota cartel, which 
generated general price-setting insecurity (ii-a), the price war triggered by one of the oligopolists, who desperately tried 
to improve poor utilization of capacity and squeeze out competitors (ii-b), and the general decline in construction 
activity (ii-c). Within the framework of an econometric model based on data of one German cement producer, we find 
that sufficient levels of competition prevailed throughout the cartel period. Furthermore, the demand structure did not 
change from 2001 to 2002 so as to suggest a fundamental change in competition. Finally, no excess income or profit 
can be computed. In fact, we show that the general demand regime estimated for the period 1995 to 2001, which is the 
period of alleged market power, equally well describes the market condition of 2002. Price war and a collapsing 
construction market lead suppliers to maintain levels of production and capacity utilization, thus sacrificing profits at 
the expense of the market shares of small and medium-sized suppliers independently from the cartel issue. This 
empirical finding of an agreed but ineffective cartel is supported by theoretical evidence on the conditions under which 
cartels can work effectively – which did not exist in the East: strong import competition, a high level of transparency 
limiting the effects of “cheap talk” and spatial pricing that generates local market power in the absence of cartels. 
Furthermore, general supply-side conditions in the cement industry suggest that a considerable level of imperfect 
competition is structurally unavoidable; antitrust possibilities that in the short run enforce additional competition based 
on the wrong assessment of effective collusion may lead to exits and less competition in the long run. We conclude that 
the methodology described may be useful for antitrust policy as it offers a credible analytical tool to compute excess 
income and profit. 
 
JEL-Classification: L4, L8, C2 
 
Keywords: antitrust, cement, competition, collusion, Germany, econometrics, excess income, excess profit, quota 
agreement 
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1.  The Economic Perspective of Antitrust Policies 
1.1  The General Antitrust-Policy Background 
Antitrust policy generally concentrates on the legal questions of identifying collusion in markets. 
As KÜHN (2001) observes, economic research has made considerable progress in identifying condi-
tions, under which collusion is likely and / or can be maintained. However, antitrust policy focuses 
on legal aspects of collusion, i.e. formal proofs for the existence of price or quota settings. Thus, 
verification in court is much easier with respect to legal aspects, i.e. through crown witness ar-
rangements, than with respect to the incurred economic inefficiency. If prices and quantities were at 
the monopolistic frontier, the economic issue could be resolved easily; however, this is rarely the 
case. Then, the methodology employed identifies comparable markets that analyze the price mecha-
nism and provide references with respect to normal prices and normal profits. However, how can 
the case be resolved if no comparative market exists?  
 
In this paper, we take up the case of the East German Cement Cartel. We use the case as an appro-
priate reference structure to show in the theoretical sections 
•  the limits of using the concept of “comparative markets” in highly specialized industries; 
•  the appropriateness of defining “hypothetical reference markets” which leads to a reference 
model of competition in a certain industry – in our case: the cement industry; 
 
We further proceed, in our empirical sections, into the econometric analysis of demand in order to 
inquire into potential changes in market power stemming from the end of the cartel at the end of 
2001. This is imbedded in the historical case of the privatization of the East German Cement Com-
bine (Kombinat) that very strongly determined the initial market structure.  
1.2  The Ruling of the German Antitrust Agency  
In April 2003 the German Antitrust Agency (GAA) levied a fine of € 661 million against the lead-
ing six German producers of cement. They were accused of having illegally increased prices by 
establishing regional quotas; furthermore, they were accused of conduct that resulted in reduced 
competition in this market. The fines set were as follows: 
 




Fine (in € 
million) 
Heidelberger Cement AG    252 
Schwenk Zement KG    142 
Dyckerhoff AG  Buzzi, Italy  95 
Lafarge Zement GmbH  Lafarge, France  86 
Alsen AG  Holcim, Switzerland  74 
Readymix AG  RCM, England  12 
Total   661 
 
The fines levied by the GAA were set within the framework of the German Act Against Restraints 
of Competition (GWB)
1. First, the illegal behavior is punished; then the additional income and the 
additional profit are measured in order not to make illegal behavior worthwhile; finally, increases or 
                                                 
1   Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen, §§ 81, 34 GWB.  5 
reductions to fines may be made to account for especially high levels of misconduct, i.e. a repeated 
offense, or cooperation, i.e. a key witness privilege. 
 
The cartel, which according to the GAA had existed in the four market areas of Germany, the East, 
the North, the Central West and the South, came to an end in 2001. This allegedly led to a sharp 
drop in cement prices in Germany. However, at the same time, one of the large suppliers had started 
a ruinous price war that extended, because of multi-market competition, with some time delay first 
to the North and the Central West and then to the South. In addition, a continuing decline in con-
struction activity led to a further drop in capacity utilization and thus exerted further pressure on 











































   
 
The GAA used the market structure, in particular the price structure of 2002, as the comparative 
market period and calculated an additional income for the alleged participants of 10 € per ton – 
which, if multipliers accounting for the severity of misconduct are included, yields the above-
mentioned fines for the period covered, which covers 5 years before the GAA’s ruling, i.e. 1997 to 
2001. These arguments put forward by the GAA leave the following questions open and make the 
issue interesting within a more international framework of antitrust policy: 
1.  What justifies using the 2002 period as an acceptable reference period? 
2.  What are the intrinsic characteristics of a comparative market period? 
3.  How can different influences on the price of cement, i.e. the end of the cartel, a steep decline in 
demand because of the downswing in the construction industry, and the price war started by one 
competitor be separated and attributed to the price decline? 
4.  What approaches are theoretically and practically suitable for a calculation of additional reve-
nue, i.e. distinguish between fully competitive and monopolistic price regimes? To what extent 
do external influences such as the aggregate demand for cement or changes in risk-revenue pro-
files influence this reasoning?  6 
5.  How can market dominance or market power be identified, and has a sufficient
2 change in the 
level of competition occurred from 2001 to 2002, i.e. can it be shown that a pre-existing and al-
legedly effective cartel has been dissolved? 
 
In this paper, we will analyze these questions with reference to the East German cement cartel, be-
cause this is the only cartel affirmed by the defendants. This cartel came into existence after the 
privatization of the East German Cement Kombinat. Because of the politically-driven push towards 
large-scale production in all industries, the German Democratic Republic (GDR) had only a few 
suppliers serving their districts and producing for export. Thus, the present East German market is 
rather “cleansed”, i.e. there are four major and a number of medium-sized suppliers with a limited 
technological spread.  
 
We proceed as follows: we start with a brief survey of the development of the East German cement 
market after unification; we then show why economic rigor is crucial in antitrust cases; this is ex-
tended to three aspects, namely the appropriateness of the reference market chosen by the GAA, the 
search for changes in competition levels after the end of the quotas, and the price-setting strategies. 
An attempt to quantify excess income and excess profit is made based on data of one of the German 
cement producers who has – depending on demand levels - a share of 5 % - 10 % in the total mar-
ket; finally, a summary of what antitrust policy can learn from this case is offered.  
 
2. Historical  Background 
2.1 Treuhand  Requirements 
The rules set by the Treuhand Anstalt (The German Privatization Agency for Unification) required 
the priority of private over public reorganization and binding rules on employment and investments 
which accompanied public loans and subsidies. In many cases, East German assets were worth 
nothing – often they even had a negative value because of old loans on the books and environmental 
liabilities. However, an important interest of investors lay in the acquisition of market share as well 
as the securing of favorable production sites and qualified labor. 
2.2  Expectations of Investors in the East German Market 
Given the consumption of cement in West Germany and the necessity for reconstruction in the East, 
a steady state demand of 7,5m t. to 8m t. seemed realistic
3. Short-term demand would exceed this 
level, however, and at the end of the Nineties demand plummeted because of a dramatic drop in 
construction activity, as we see in Figure 2. Imports played a decisive role until the end of the Nine-
ties, because other countries, in particular Poland and the Czech Republic, dumped large quantities 
into the East German market in order to earn hard currency and utilize old capacities that would 
have to be closed with the ongoing integration into the European Union. This preceded the alleged 
breakup of the cartel; imports fell drastically with the modernization of the plants and the shrinking 
of the East German market from 2000 onwards. 
2.3 Division  of  Markets 
Four large investors, Dyckerhoff, Lafarge, Readymix and Schwenk entered the East German market, 
which was split up according to the delivery structure of the East German cement Kombinat. 
Schwenk (21 %) acquired Bernburg, Dyckerhoff (22 %) Deuna,  Readymix (25 %) Rüdersdorf near 
Berlin and Lafarge (32 %) Karsdorf (the figures in parentheses represent rounded average market 
                                                 
2   We assume a change in the competition level to be relevant if its identification is possible in the demand function. 
3   Total capacity was about 12 mill. tons in 2002.  7 
shares of the four suppliers only). These four represented about 40 % - 80 % of the market of na-
tional suppliers, i.e. medium sized firms in the East and other importers from West Germany. In the 
mid-1990’s, the four large investors only had a share of about 60 % of the market, as 30 % had been 
absorbed by imports from Eastern countries. Thus a varying share of about 10 % to 15 % was cap-
tured by smaller “Mittelstand” companies. 
 
Figure 2:  































Locations of Cement Producers in East Germany 
(O   no own clinker production) 
 
  8 
2.4 Import  Competition,  Unregistered Quantities, and Price War 
As mentioned before, imports played a decisive role in the East German market. They were offered 
at delivered prices of about 5 €/ton below the price of local suppliers. This was considered as an 
offset necessary to compensate for less regular deliveries and sometimes non-existing quality guar-
anties that have to be offset by an increased input share in concrete production.  
 
From 1994 to 1998, one of the major suppliers dumped 1 million tons of additional cement (“unreg-
istered quantities”) into the Eastern market in order to improve capacity utilization at its plant; these 
were not reported to the Bundesverband der Zementindustrie, whose statistics were used to equili-
brate quotas
4. He was forced to return to agreed quota levels in 1999. In early 2002, this supplier 
started a price war, again to improve capacity utilization. At that time demand for construction in 
East Germany had fallen to an all-time low. Constant decreases in increments translate into expo-
nentially increasing rates of decline. Given an over-proportionate relationship between construction 
activity and cement use, this exerted accelerating pressure on the cement industry. Figure 4 shows 
the very cyclical nature of construction volume in East Germany which is neatly followed by ce-
ment consumption (see Figure 7). 
Imports put pressure on the cartel. Maintaining the agreement made long-term sense to all partici-
pants, however, as the possibility of Eastern suppliers producing in dilapidated facilities that did not 
meet European environmental standards would have to come to an end with their countries’ integra-
tion into Europe, the subsequent need to invest as well as the upward pressure on the value of East-
ern European currencies.  
 
Figure 4: 





























                                                 
4   The reduced volumes delivered by other suppliers, who had the impression of a compressed market, can be seen in 
Figure 2; the argument will be taken up again in section 5.2.  9 
3.  Judicial Ambiguity and Economic Theory 
3.1  Entitlement and Legal Underpinnings 
Because cement is a local good and because of its lack of effects on foreign markets, the case dis-
cussed here falls within the jurisdiction of the GAA.     
 
In accordance with § 30 of the Act Regarding Offences (Ordnungswidrigkeitengesetz, abbreviated 
OWiG), the board of directors of corporations and unincorporated associations are regularly ac-
cused of committing an offence in their capacity as the legally authorized representative of the 
company, through whom duties are claimed to have been violated, which relate to the corporation  
or unincorporated association.  Under § 30 OWiG, agreeing to a price-fixing scheme leads to a fine 
against the corporate representatives and a disgorgement of any excess profit derived by the com-
pany in accordance with § 81 GWB.  
 
If the GAA is of the opinion that such price-fixing arrangements can be proven, then a fine is levied 
in accordance with § 81 para. 1 and 2 GWB and § 30 para. 1 Nr. 1 OWiG. Under §§ 81 para. 2 and 
81 para. 1 Nr. 1 GWB, violations of the prohibition against anticompetitive agreements set out in  § 
1 GWB can be met with fines of up to  € 500,000.00 (base fine) and beyond this amount up to treble 
the amount of the excess profits earned on account of the violation (special fine). According to § 30 
para. 1 Nr. 1 OWiG, the fine can also be levied against a company if the authorized representative 
body of a legal person has committed a violation through which duties which affect the legal person 
are violated, or the legal person benefits from, or was to benefit from, the violation.   
 
The special fine, in relation to the maximum amount of € 500,000.00 for the base fine, first be-
comes relevant if the excess profits exceed € 166,667.00 (up to three times the amount of the excess 
income). Thus in measuring the amount of a potential fine, the issue of the amount of possible ex-
cess profits must be analyzed first. Within the resulting framework (base or special fine), the exact 
calculation of a fine, taking into account the nature of the violator(s) and the violation(s), is to be 
done in a second step. Here the general criteria for the setting of fines contained in under § 17 para. 
3 OWiG are to be observed, including in particular the significance of the deed and the violation 
being alleged, the gravity of the restraint on competition, the issue of intentional or negligent con-
duct, the economic situation of the violator as well as principles of proportionality.   
 
In setting the level of the fine the basis used is the additional proceeds, i.e. the additional sales, and 
not the additional profits. Actual receipts are looked at. Any taxes applied to such proceeds are not 
deducted in deriving any excess proceeds amount.  
 
According to § 17 para. 3 OwiG, in setting the level of any fine the financial condition of the com-
pany is to be taken into account in addition to the significance of the competition law violation. In 
considering the financial condition of the company, the sales volume is primarily determinative. 
Losses tend to reduce the amount of any fine. A continued economic decline also influences the 
level of the fine, since a fine set too high could have a negative impact on the company. In the lit-
erature the view is presented that the existence and competitiveness of a company may not be jeop-
ardized by a fine set too high.  In the context of determining the abovementioned proportionality of 
a fine, one must also take into account to what extent jobs might be jeopardized because of a fine.  
Thus any fine may not disproportionately impact the company and as such may not result in the 
insolvency of the company. The ability of the company to continue operating can also be observed 
by arranging for installment payments in the setting of any fine.  
 
Under § 17 para. 3 OwiG the significance of the violation and the accusation made against the vio-
lator serve as the basis for setting any fine. Here as well the financial situation comes into play. The  10 
significance of the fine depends upon the factual nature, duration and scope of the violative deed. 
The extent of the potential harm, the disadvantaging and gravity of protected legal goods and inter-
ests are all to be considered. The frequency and duration of similar violations and the way in which 
they were carried out are to be included in setting the level of any fine, because the fines are meant 
to prevent the violator and others from further violations.  
3.2 The  Reference  Market 
Because of the different conceptions of reference markets and the generality of the legal norms set 
in § 19 Par. 4 No. 2 GWB, the antitrust authorities enjoy rather broad discretion in making deci-
sions in this area. However, they are not entirely free in their choices. 
 
Fundamentally, no market power should exist in a reference market, or it should at least be more 
competitive than the affected reference market (IMMENGA/MESTMÄCKER 2001, § 19 GWB  Rz. 162; 
BECHTOLD 2002, § 19 GWB Rz. 72). Furthermore, additional norms and limitations stem from the 
three aspects of reference markets, i.e. the product, geographic and temporal factors. 
 
(1)  The variant of the comparable product market implies a production-technology related simi-
larity between the relevant market, and similarities in input and output delivery structures 
(BECHTOLD 2002, § 19, Rz. 73). The uniqueness of the cement markets is well reflected in in-
ternational literature
5 and suggests that essentially there is no way to find a comparable prod-
uct market. 
(2) In  practice,  comparable geographical markets play an important role. Thus in the national 
context, such a choice of market is only possible if the case in question does not cover the 
whole country. Otherwise, the GAA has to resort to foreign countries (BECHTOLD, § 19, Rz. 
73). In our case, as the GAA suspects quotas in all four (sub-) markets of Germany, a foreign 
market would have to be chosen that has, compared to Germany, a greater level of competi-
tion. As the following Table suggests, prices outside Germany in 2002 all considerably ex-
ceed those in Germany and it is difficult to imagine that in all cases these higher prices were 
the result of cartels. 
 
Table 2: 
Cement Prices in Europe, 2002 
Country  Price (US-$ per t.)  Country  Price (US-$ per t.)
Belgium 74  Netherlands 74 
Denmark 61  Austria  74 
Germany-West 46  Poland  66 
Germany-East 41  Spain  66 
Finland 66  Sweden  66 
France 80  Switzerland  108 
Italy 66  Czech  Republic  74 
Source: JP MORGAN 1/2003 
 
(3)  The concept of comparable market periods has historically played a rather minor role. Thus, it 
is astonishing that it was chosen by the GAA in the cement case. In fact, the GAA used it in 
the Seventies. In one of these cases, it was heavily criticized for having been manipulated in 
favor of enterprises. Thus, it is generally accepted that the antitrust authority should only re-
sort to a comparable market period if it is very clear that the preceding market was truly com-
petitive. The argument could run in an analogous way for a later market. 
                                                 
5 See references in the following chapter  11 
3.3  Conclusions for the Cement Case 
Besides these arguments, the user of reference markets is rather free in selecting the methodology if 
it is scientifically accepted and complies with the aims of § 19 Par. 4 No. 2 GWB. In fact, it has to 
be shown that (i) the period of 2002 is acceptable as a reference and that, (ii) because of the quota 
regimes, excess incomes and profits were generated, i.e. the cartel was effective. 
 
If it can either be proven that 
•  2002 is not a reference period, i.e. a comparable market period, or 
•  quota regimes did not function and thus excess incomes and profits were not realized,  
the case could be closed. 
 
As it is scientifically much more difficult to provide a general proof and much easier to test a credi-
ble counter-example, the latter approach is chosen here to test the solidity of the arguments of the 
GAA. We do not argue that the quota arrangement did not exist; the only argument is that the 
choice of a reference market by the GAA is not appropriate to support their case, i.e. for their calcu-
lation of excess revenue. We also propose a methodology to economically proceed in this and simi-
lar antitrust cases. This complies with the judicial reasoning that the generality in terms of legal 
prescriptions calls for high scientific standards with respect to the economic methodology, which 
thus should meet rigorous standards. 
 
4.  Reference Markets and Models of Competition 
4.1  From Relevant to Reference Markets 
The relevant comparable product, geographical market or market period has to be defined by the 
antitrust authorities. This reference market has to be more competitive than the relevant market in 
which competition was reduced by quota agreements. Furthermore, the reference market should 
provide a reference price level, i.e. should benefit from some stability. Figure 5 below comprises 
these aspects. 
 
The theoretical argument behind this reasoning runs as follows: market equilibria are stable if no 
player has a benefit of deviating. This benefit may have a long-term and a short-term perspective. In 
the short run, underbidding in prices may generate additional revenues for the respective firm; in the 
long run, it could end in a destruction of all profits (BERTRAND competition). As a consequence, 
collusive arrangements become more probable – irrespective of their formal or informal level of 
agreement – if short term gains of price changes are low and long-term threats especially through 
price wars are credible. The more the number of competitors in a market grows and the more differ-
entiated products become, the less advantageous a price decrease and the less credible retaliations 
will be as gains in market shares are small and only incomplete substitutes are hit. We would thus 
expect collusive arrangements especially in narrow markets with homogenous products but we 
would be unable to distinguish them from competitive regimes with very similar conduct and per-
formance unless outright monopolistic behavior is observed. Even the existence of a formal cartel 
agreement could, under certain conditions, be irrelevant for the profitability of the firms. An impor-
tant argument proposed by KÜHN (2001, p. 172+) may provide an important help for identifying the 
level of economic damage produced by a formal cartel: collusion is especially attractive, if multiple 
market equilibria exist and, as a consequence, players can, through proper signaling, move markets 
to a more profitable regime.  
 
In terms of testable hypotheses, this implies that the increased level of competition in the reference 
market must be stable for a reasonable period that allows a comparison between its competitive and 
the allegedly non-competitive prices in the cartel period. This is a prerequisite for an accurate calcu- 12 
lation of excess income and profit. It implies that a dynamic equilibrium exists in a reference mar-








As a next step, it must be shown that the comparable market is itself competitive – which is in fact 
only a transfer of the problem of identifying and evaluating competition regimes away from the 
relevant market - the proof of competitiveness of the reference market needs a subsequent reference 
market (BLUM 2003). As this produces an infinite regress, a theoretical benchmark must be devel-
oped. The easiest and cleanest approach would be to compare the inflicted market to a neoclassical 
reference model
6. However, real world competition is intrinsically imperfect. Structure, conduct and 
performance in real world competition could be very close to collusion regimes unless they are fully 
monopolistic. Thus, the theory of competition only provides antitrust authorities with limited in-
struments to properly identify efficient collusions. 
 
As price dynamics analyzed in part 5 need not be an unambiguous sign of a functioning level of 
competition
7, we will add spatial price setting behavior to our analysis in part 6 and inquire into 
changes in competition regimes in part 7.  
                                                 
6   In fact, the GAA always takes reference to “full and unlimited competition”. 
7   The scholar is caught between two arguments: on the one hand, constant prices could describe the situation of a 
competitive steady state; spontaneous price movements then would be the sigh of a cartel playing competition. On 
the other hand, market-induces price dynamics could be smoothed by a cartel. This controversy is discussed by 
WHITNEY (1958): the WHITNEY-paradoxon is a situation in which the volatility of a market is artificial to disguise 
From the Relevant Market to the Reference Market
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4.2  Rejection of the Reference Market 2002 
The East German as well as the whole German Market do not satisfy the stability conditions of a 
reference market for the following reasons: 
1.  Stability: the fall in prices in 2002 has not ended in a new equilibrium. The missing support line 
could be a sign of a typical price war or a simple price overshooting. No price convergence can 
be found throughout this year. Thus, the future development of prices should be awaited. 
2.  Unexplained persistence of price differentials: the stable price differential of 10 € per ton be-
tween the high-priced North and South German and the low-priced West and East German mar-
kets cannot be explained within the context of the same institutional framework, especially if 
the lower priced eastern market is the only one in which the participation in a quota cartel has 
not been disputed. 
3.  Unresolved identification problem: three factors could be individually wholly responsible for 
the rapid decline in prices: the decline in construction demand; the price war; the formerly in-
creased price levels maintained by a functioning cartel that had ended. The GAA has not pro-
vided a model or even a logical structure that proves beyond reasonable doubt that, for the pe-
riod of 2002, the price decline resulted solely from the end of the quota agreements. In fact, ce-
ment prices in Germany started to rise from the mid-1970’s onwards, as Figure 1 shows. Con-
struction volume stagnated until German Unification lead to a bubble that peaked in the mid-
1990’s and later burst as shown in Figure 4. Thus, tremendous drops in demand were recent 
phenomena in the cement industry. 
4.3  The Situation in the Cement Industries 
4.3.1  General Demand Conditions  
Cement is a rather homogenous product in a mature market. Demand “breathes” with the market, 
especially with construction demand. As the input is complementary, often even limiting with re-
spect to construction, demand elasticity with respect to price is close to zero for the total market. 
However, as individual suppliers compete for market shares, the higher the level of competition, the 
more the elasticity moves away from zero. Following the general-equilibrium approaches proposed 
by HARBERGER (1962) and MCLURE (1969), high firm-specific elasticities cancel out in the total 
because of cross-elasticities. 
 
Because of its homogeneity, cement industries are hardly able to differentiate their products. In fact, 
differentiation emerges through geography, i.e. spatial pricing. It is an experience good and, thus, 
standardization plays an important role. In case of special cements, reputation plays a dominant 
role. 
 
The share of cement in construction costs in general is only about 2%, but for certain construction 
industries, such as prefabricated components, bridges or tunnels, it is somewhat higher. These cus-
tomers, often also part of an oligopolistic market, may exert strong pressure on prices.  
4.3.2  Local Demand, Monopolistic Competition, and Geographic Pricing 
Following the definition of STIGLER und SHERWIN (1985), a market is an area within which the 
prices of a good converge to a single value. Transportation costs may be included in case of com-
plete price differentiation, i.e. if buyers are charged fob-prices. The transportation cost of cement 
would normally limit its economic distance to about 150 km. However, by means of price discrimi-
nation some customers can be charged increased prices, especially in locations close to the mill 
and/or sufficiently far away from competitors. Given these increased profits, suppliers could enter 
                                                                                                                                                                  
the existence of a cartel. Conversely, parallel pricing may not be the result of a cartel, as the American Tobacco case 
of 1946 in the US and the Wood Pulp case in Europe of 1985 suggest.   14 
markets of competitors at reduced prices. Excessive “reverse dumping”, especially in case of price 
wars, would finally result in flat spatial (delivered) prices. Under normal market conditions, prices 
should vary in space because either market power exists or because distinctly different local market 
conditions allow increased price levels. For instance, ABBOTT (1994) shows that both aspects are 
relevant to the US cement industry. 
 
With an increased level of concentration of industry, theory suggests that the ability to keep prices 
above marginal costs rises (see next section) if demand is not fully elastic with respect to prices – 
which gives incentives to imports, especially if navigable water access is possible and creates dis-
tinct geographic market patterns (DUMEZ,  JEUNEMAÎTRE 2000). As ROSENBAUM and READING 
(1988) observe, these imports will limit domestic market power. The following table gives relevant 




Transportation Costs in the Cement Market 
Transportation Means  Road  Rail  Sea 
Loading and commissioning  ca. 3 €/t  ca. 2,5 €/t  - 
Transportation  ca. 0,05 €/tkm  ca. 0,04 €/tkm  ca. 12 €/t 
Unloading  -  ca. 3,5 €/t  ca. 13 €/t 
Standard freight weight  25 t  1300 t  10.000 t 
Sum of transport costs*  ca. 8  €/t   ca. 22 €/t  ca. 25 €/t 
Critical distance (with respect to)  300 km (rail)  725 km (sea)   
Source: own calculation and D’ASPREMONT et al. 2000,  
* with respect to an average distance of 100km, 400 km and full load  
 
Transportation costs may lead to monopolistic competition; thus, geographic price setting may be-
come telling. Will it be non-discriminatory, which implies competition only where market areas 
overlap? Or will it be discriminatory, which implies competition in all places? This very much de-
pends on geographic structures and on the gaining of experience in dealing with competitors. Be-
cause most firms' suppliers will supply from different locations, multi-market competition exerts a 
disciplining effect (BERNHEIM, WHINSTON 1990). 
4.3.3 Sunk  Costs 
Entry costs into the cement industry – apart from imports – are high and include important irre-
versibilities because clinker production and silos are unique, as are investments in quarries and the 
respective environmental licenses necessary to run the business. The level of these sunk costs is 
important to market structure (FUDENBERG,  TIROLE 1984; BLUM,  MÖNIUS 1997; BLUM ET. AL. 
2004). If they are too high, no market entry will occur. If entry is feasible for a (first) monopolist, 
he may be the only supplier able to make a profit, as additional entries will erode profits beyond 
sunk cost levels – and entry will be blocked. If they are sufficiently low, the incumbent may ac-
commodate entry because blocking would be too expensive. Between these two levels, entry may be 
deterred by varying the price in order to just make entry unprofitable and thus deter the entrant. 
This line of argument is valid for each consecutive entry: at one point in time, a mature and stable 
market will be reached in which future entries are either impossible – this would suggest a wider 
oligopoly- or may be deterred – this would suggest a narrower oligopoly. The latter situation is the 
only market structure where price wars make sense! It may be oriented against local potential en-
trants or importers. 
 
In order to avoid these wars, the entrant may signal friendly behavior, i.e. enter with limited capaci-
ties, which, for instance can be shown for the Norwegian case (SÖGARD 1992). To make entry eas-
ier, entrants may wait until incumbents have reached the end of their investment cycle – which will  15 
reduce the length of the cycle as a strategic answer of incumbents and imply that „best practice 
technologies” may prevail (STIGLITZ 1987). Cement industries use the majority of their capital (incl. 
querries) for at least 40 years; thus, the technology race argument does not offer any market entry 
explanation for opportunities. 
 
How would these arguments change under circumstances of excess capacity? 
•  One argument followed above was that collusion or parallel behavior, by reducing risk, would 
trigger investment and produce excess capacity that allows market participants to guarantee de-
liveries, even in situations of very large demand. As long as total capacity installed is not way 
beyond any possible demand, excess capacity should not destroy the above line of arguments. 
•  However, if excess capacity becomes even larger than the above-mentioned maximum demand, 
then some oligopolists might engage in price wars in order to cleanse the market structure. This 
can only be a successful strategy if differences in technology or differences in financial re-
sources make such a venture viable. But one problem in the cement industry is the ability of 
market participants to switch off and on certain facilities in response to changing price and de-
mand levels. Thus, such a price war would have to prevail for a period of sufficient duration to 
erode the financial resources of some incumbents. Most likely, this is the sort of price war ob-
served in the cement market in Germany in 2002. 
4.3.4  Process Innovation and Best Practice Technologies 
This convergence of productivities will make market exit not a question of production performance 
but of market performance and – of utmost importance – of financial resources. Furthermore, com-
parable technologies will induce parallel behavior of incumbents even without cartel agreements, 
i.e. pooling equilibria will prevail under conditions of stable markets (MILGROM, ROBERTS 1992).  
4.3.5  Market Transparency and Strategic Behavior 
As D’ASPREMONT, ENCAOUA und PONSSARD (2000) argue, strategic behavior may play an impor-
tant role in the highly transparent cement market. Thus the choice of a proper reference market be-
comes a task that is hard to fulfill once a competition regime without market power is sought. The 
general proposition that welfare increases with a more intensive level of competition finds its limi-
tations if sunk costs exist, because cut-throat-competion à la BERTRAND will narrow the number of 
suppliers and generate welfare losses (NORMAN, THISSE 1996). Thus, implicit or explicit agree-
ments will develop, i.e. a “tit-for tat”
8 in the sense of friendly COURNOT-type quantity competition, 
which maintains group structure. Then, the antitrust authorities are caught between two evils. This 
problem was articulated by KANTZENBACH (1966) who defined an “optimal intensity of competi-
tion” in a wide oligopoly with sufficient product heterogeneity. He postulated optimal combination 
of innovation, financing and competition, and this idea was included, in 1973, in the German Anti-
trust Code (§ 5 GWB) by allowing small and medium-sized enterprises to organize alliances against 
large incumbents.  
 
The transparency of the cement market also implies that signaling in search of a more advantageous 
equilibrium may not play a decisive role as “cheap talk” (FARRELL 1987) would not improve com-
mon knowledge
9. Two arguments support this proposition: 
1.  market transparency is high because little private information on market conditions and 
technologies (i.e. price structures) exists;  
2.  even in cases where private information existed, decisions on market conduct are reversible 
given large capacities – i.e. commitments have no “sunk” credibility. 
                                                 
8 GARICANO and GERTNER (2000), provide an excellent example for the American airline industry in 1998. 
9 Sometimes government produces increased market transparency in an attempt to increase competition. The result can 
be entirely adverse, as the case for the concrete industry of Denmark shows (ALBAEK et al., 1997).   16 
4.3.6  Consequences for Competition in the Cement Industry 
We do not expect low prices, i.e. prices that lead to negative profits and are below the risk-revenue 
line to prevail over an extended period. If momentarily low prices exist they are generally the result 
of price wars in an attempt to either prevent potential entrants to enter the market – in our case 
make imports less attractive
10 – or shake out some competitors – often medium-sized industries
11 – 
which may then pose a problem for antitrust policies and even for societal welfare (DEWEY 1979)
12. 
In the case at hand, the late Nineties would relate to import competition, whereas 2002 to enforcing 
the reduction of capacity in an already cleansed market. This is formalized as follows in the next 
section. 
4.4   A Formal Model of Demand 
 
If we assume that the four dominant face a market demand of size X(M) that breathes with the level 
of construction activity, M. Each of the oligopolists has a market share  i α . There exists a “competi-
tive edge”
13 of medium size enterprises and importers that offers “extra” quantities xe (q) for market 
prices q. Given his costs for spatial and other types of differentiation, the supply function becomes 
in a fob-setting: 
 




xe − ⋅ =  . 
 
The residual demand function facing oligopolist i is (where f is an increasing function):  
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The elasticity of demand with respect to prices is  
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The model explains that 
•  larger markets X(M) reduce the (absolute value of the) elasticity of demand facing the indi-
vidual oligopolist as volume in the denominator rises; 
•  if prices rise, elasticities, in absolute terms, rise simultaneously because the nominator in-
creases and the denominator decreases (volumes of the “competitive edge” rise because it 
becomes more attractive to serve the market); 
•  more product or geographic differentiation, d,  increases absolute values of elasticities be-
cause of the costs incurred volume falls (in zones were supply overlaps, demand elasticities 




                                                 
10 In fact, in a market, it is hard to distinguish whether an incumbent tries to contest the market of an importer or vice 
versa. 
11 Some medium-sized suppliers, for instance, do not have their own clinker production.  
12 See, for instance, the controversy between FOURIÉ, SMITH (1994, 1995) and LEACH (1994) 
13 HOLLANDER (1990) uses residual demand analysis in cartels to model how quotas originally assigned to downstream 
producers end up in the hand of upstream producers.  17 
4.5   A Reference Model of Competition 
The model of polypolistic competition is entirely inappropriate for describing the true situation of 
the cement industry. More dynamic concepts are needed. The same applies to the concepts devel-
oped by the school of “old industrial economists” (MASON 1939; BAIN 1949, 1968; CLARK 1940, 
1955, 1961) because its results are entirely ambiguous with respect to the link between market 
structure and market conduct, as well as between market conduct and market performance (BLUM 
2004a, ch. 14). The radical prescriptions of the supply-oriented school (GILDER, 1981) and the Chi-
cago school (BROZEN, 1975; POSNER, 1976) are of no help, as they limit government to the control 
of the access to resources and price agreements, not quota agreements. SCHUMPETER (1912) and 
DEMSETZ (1973, 1994) reverse their arguments as they suggest that an improved market perform-
ance, especially through innovation, leads to market power and thus influences industry structure – 
which is supported by management strategies (PORTER 1994). We thus depart from KANTZENBACH 
and augment his model by including elements from evolutionary competition theory and new indus-
trial economics (BLUM 2003) with the following properties: 
•  Market development, especially technological development is path-dependent because of 
costs sunk into assets and licenses, existing technologies and demand structures; this implies 
that industry configuration will show strong inertia. 
•  Market pressure and the homogeneity of the good imply a dominance of process over prod-
uct innovations, which are organized in series. Periodic price wars whose occurrence should 
be related to theses series of innovations will shake out those suppliers which have not, in 
due time, reorganized their capital stock. 
•  Multi-market competition disciplines suppliers, as they know that they can always be hit in 
their most vulnerable location and market. 
•  Even in the absence of formal agreements, the homogeneity and the transparency of the in-
dustry will encourage a considerable level of parallel behavior and tit for tat responses. 
However, distance and associated transport costs enforce price differentiation, even dis-
crimination. In the latter case, non-zero elasticities of demand likely exist on the company 
level. 
•  If low-priced imports exist, i.e. they are not controlled by limitations of market and access, 
they will play an important role in controlling prices and quantities. Local incumbents will 
be forced to lower prices to maintain their market or even drive out imports unless importers 
are treated as partners in the tit-for-tat regime
14. We will not necessarily expect outright 
price wars but sizeable price turbulences. 
•  Extended price wars exist under situations of excess capacities far beyond possible future 
demand volumes. Entrants will try to drive out other entrants. The more cleansed a market 
is, the more time such a war will take. 
 
Figure 6 depicts this situation. We presume a homogenous product for which differentiation 
only exists through geographic distance, i.e. through transportation costs. In case of the closest 
group structure, the duopoly, we would expect a ruinous level of competition – but this is the 
theoretically limiting case, as neither of the two players can be sure to win such a war for the 
market, given the very similar technologies. Thus, because of a very credible threat, it is more 
likely that the two collude and make some sort of explicit or tacit market arrangements even 
though the temptation to take over the whole market is high.  
 
 
                                                 
14 Given the fact that lowering the price in order to increase market share will result in a symmetrical behavior by the 
competitors, the inferior outcome of this prisoner dilemma game will encourage players to seek refuge in coopera-
tion-sustaining strategies, i.e. to become altruistic. From an evolutionary point of view, the repeated prisoners’ di-
lemma game results in a tit-for-tat situation as a likely outcome of reciprocal altruism; see TRIVERS (1971), AX-
























If sufficient rents exist, market entries will occur and arrangements will become more difficult to 
sustain. The intensity of potential competition will thus fall and the intensity of effective competi-
tion will rise until the two intersect. In this situation of a wide oligopoly, perhaps even accompanied 
by a heterogeneous group structure, more stability evolves. Oscillation between two equilibria be-
comes more unlikely. Outright price wars will become rare unless they are triggered by special cir-
cumstances. A reference market could thus be established in the area called “wide oligopoly”; under 
certain circumstances, group structure could become – compared to market volume – narrow, the 
tit-for-tat region with its periodic instabilities which will be healed after sufficient experience build-
ing or shakeouts of competitors. 
 
5.  A Time-Series Analysis of the East-German Cement Market 
5.1  Identification of Market Power 
As a main argument, the GAA insinuates that market power has existed over the period in question 
because of the cartel agreements. This allowed the cement industry to extract a higher price than the 
price in a fully competitive market. This argument is put to a test within the framework of an econo-
metric model. The concept of excess revenue used by the GAA implies a downward shift of the 
demand function with the end of the cartel
15. However, a shift in the demand curve could also be 
responsible for changes in competition regimes. We thus inquire into a structural break of the de-
mand curve in terms of (i), a structural break, (ii) a change in price regimes and, (iii) functional 
form. Our analysis is based on the demand function established in section 4, formulae (1-3). 
                                                 
15   The definition of excess revenue used by the GAA is based on the difference between prices at given quantities, i.e. 
a shift of the demand function. Due to the existence of additional market power, firms are assumed to extract, at 
given quantities, higher prices than under competition regimes. However, because of the interaction of prices and 
quantities, some scholars argue the difference between revenues under cartel conditions, i.e. cartel prices and cartel 
quantities, and those under competitive conditions should be used; this would imply a shift on the demand function; 
see KLUSMANN 1999; MEURER 1998; ERLINGHAGEN, ZIPPEL 1974. 
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5.2  Period Covered, Data Used and Economic Significance  
We estimate a demand model for cement for one supplier in the East German market, the X-
Company. We used quantities delivered in metric tons as endogenous (x) and, as exogenous vari-
ables, (cif-) prices (q) in € per metric ton, the index of demand in the construction industry (Y, see 
Figure 4) and, as a link to the West German market, the ratio between construction demand indices 
in the West and in the East (WE). The data set is based on monthly data and covers the period from 
January 1995 to December 2002. We added monthly dummies, if necessary, to account for a sea-
sonal structure where necessary
16. We thus assume that prices, construction demand and seasonal 
effects are the general driving forces of demand for cement from X-Company and that certain spill-
overs between the Eastern and the Western markets are possible. In order to test for a structural 
break between December 2001 and January 2002, when the cartel broke down, we add a dummy for 
the 12 months of 2002 in a special regression. Figure 7 portrays the development of quantities – the 
endogenous; the pattern neatly follows that of construction demand in Figure 4. Figure 8 shows 
prices, the most interesting exogenous: we see a steep fall in 2002 of some 40 points – it exceeds 
that of the German average, as West German prices took a dive some months later and dropped at a 
slower rate. We have translated quantities and prices into indices for reasons of protecting our data 
source. 
 
For our purpose, the most interesting economic result of the price variable would be a unit elasticity 
with respect to demand, as this would imply that any change in price is entirely compensated by an 
opposite change in quantities, thus making any additional or excess revenue impossible. Further-
more, we will test whether changes in demand were price-induced or induced by overall construc-
tion demand – or both. This is important as this may provide insights into changes in market power, 


































                                                 
16   As an alternative, we could have added an extended BOX-JENKINS-type autocorrelation structure. We refrained from 
it because of the loss of observations.  20 
Figure 8: 



























5.3  Statistical Properties of the Data and Estimation Techniques 
5.3.1  Stationarity of Time Series 
Given the price-setting behavior of the cement industry, i.e. the strong stickiness for reasons of oli-
gopolistic interaction unless price wars occur, autocorrelative structures are very likely. Thus, we 
first tested the stationarity of all time series (taken to the log as we use a multiplicative COBB-
DOUGLAS-type demand function) using the ADF-test. Only in the case of the variable relating west-
ern and eastern construction demand, we discovered a borderline case of non-stationarity for which 
rejection at the 1 % level was not possible. Thus, we also employed the PERRON test which clearly 
suggested stationarity. The sharp price decline shown in Figure 8 suggests that, at least from the end 
of 2002 onwards, the price series is no longer stationary. However, the test for the total series of 96 
observations clearly rejected the hypothesis of stationarity; a separate analysis of the last 12 months 
is not meaningful. 
5.3.2 Estimation  Techniques 
We used the EVIEWS program package and least squares with ARMA-terms for our initial models 
based on a multiplicative form (i.e. all quantitative data was taken to the log). The underlying as-
sumption of an isoelastic demand function, however, is open to challenges and by definition does 
not allow us to inquire into any changes of elasticities over time if they exist. Thus, we tested the 
functional form of the equation using the TRIO program package, which allows BOX-COX-
transformations for quantitative variables. The function estimated thus was 
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where xt is the quantity of cement consumed in period t at prices qt at a given level of industry de-
mand, Yt. WEt captures the ratio between western and eastern demand levels in order to account for  21 
indirect market effects, i.e. exports out of or imports into the East German market area, and 
i
t d structural dummies, i=1,2,...,I. A BOX-JENKINS autocorrelation term was added: 
 
(5)   96 ,..., 3 , 2 , 1 = + ⋅ = − t t t t ν µ ρ µ  , 
 
where  t ν  is white noise and ρ  the correlation coefficient.. 
 
As a separate econometric analysis of only 12 months – the period assumed by the GAA to have 
been cartel free - would be hardly significant, we tested changes within the sample. 
5.4 Results  of  Estimations 
5.4.1  Representation of Results 
The results of our estimations are represented in columns. Each column contains the elasticity of 
demand with respect to the variable given in the line; t-statistics (against the probability of the coef-
ficient being zero) are given in round parentheses; furthermore, if a variable transformation was 
applied, the transformation coefficient λ is given in angular parentheses. If λ =0, this corresponds 
to a multiplicative, a λ =1 a linear and a λ =2 a squared transformation. We omit the constant for 
reasons of protecting our data. All models are estimated as “January models”, i.e. if all months had 
to be included with dummies, the constant would represent the January. Models (1) to (5) are all 
multiplicative; functional forms are tested in models (7) and (8). Asterisks are used to show levels 
of statistical significance. 
5.4.2  Results and Statistical Interpretation 
Table 4 contains the results of the estimations. 
(1)  Model (1) gives a first simple model of demand elasticities. It already contains the main ele-
ments of the more elaborate functions (2) to (6). Elasticity with respect to prices is –0.82, with 
respect to construction demand 1.65, and with respect to the ratio between West and East con-
struction demand of 1.16. Nearly 90% of total variance is explained. We see that prices are 
flexible with respect to quantities and that production “breathes” over-proportionately with 
construction demand in the East. It is interesting that the ratio between construction demand 
in the West and East nearly has unit elasticity. This implies that the larger Western market in-
fluences production in the East. As deliveries between the Western and the Eastern markets 
are low (see following chapter), we assume that this is an expectation variable – the market of 
West Germany is by far larger. 
(2)  Model (2) adds four seasonal dummies; dummies for all other months were statistically insig-
nificant. Furthermore, an autocorrelation term is included. These statistically significant addi-
tions improved the model but do not fundamentally change the structure of the model. The 
East-West-ratio becomes more important, i.e. the link to the markets of the West. 
(3)  Model (3) tests the structural break between 2001 and 2002 attributable to the end of the 
quota agreement. The dummy is statistically insignificant. The same holds if the price variable 
is split up into two periods, one for 1995 – 2001 and the other for the year 2002, in model (4). 
The elasticities are nearly identical. This suggests that no structural break had occurred. If the 
two methods are combined in model (5), this allows the function to shift and to choose elastic-
ity for each of the sub-periods separately. A shift occurs and the elasticity for the price of 
1995-2001 changes in the direction given by the demand model: it assumed that a fall in 
prices reduce (the absolute value of the) elasticity,  we clearly see from Figure 7 that falling 
prices crowded out imports and other suppliers, so that the fall in market volume did not af-
fect X-company. However the shift is statistically insignificant and the equation does not im- 22 
prove significantly in log-likelihood (+0.9 points). Part of this change in slope may relate to 





Results of Estimations, X-Company in East Germany, 1995 - 2002 
 Models 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5)  (6) (6) 
Quantity (x)        [0,0599]  [0,1012**] 





































































































































adjusted  0.8854 0.9268 0.9260 0.9260  0.9265 0.9262 0.9306 
**: results significant at the 5% level; *: results significant at the 10% level. 
 
(4)  Models (6) and (7) test the functional form of the model because the RAMSEY reset test on 
model (4) weekly suggested non-linearities and the price elasticity showed signs of become 
more inelastic over time. In fact, the multiplicative model is supported in model (5) against 
model (2) as the log-likelihood only changes by 0.1 points. However, if we separate the trans-
formation of the endogenous from all exogenous variables, the log-likelihood shows a statisti-
cally significant improvement. The Box-Cox-transformation coefficients of the endogenous is 
close to zero and the transformation coefficient of the three quantitative exogenous is close to 
-0.5, which implies a inverse square-root function – but this coefficient is only significantly 
different from zero at the 10% level. We further added variables as in functions (3), (4) and 
(5) against function (2) in order to identify a structural break from 2001 to 2002; this, again, 
did not produce statistically significant results
18.  
 
                                                 
17  The estimation suggests that, at least with respect to the last 12 months, the reservation price of cement did not 
change much with construction demand; however, if construction demand falls, the demand function (with respect 
to price) seems to turn in clockwise direction; see Figure 12. 
18   Log-likelihoods increased by 0.9 points once the cartel-dummy was added to model (6); splitting up the price vari-
able led to an increase of 0.9 points with respect model (6). The adding the cartel dummy led to a gain of 0.1 points 
with respect to the model with split prices.  23 
The formal analysis thus supports our view that a clear-cut structural break did not occur from 2001 
to 2002. If we accept the marginal evidence found as important for further analytical inquiries, we 
again are trapped: The downwards shift of the demand function would suggest that market power 
fell once the cartel came to an end; however, the difference in demand elasticities with respect to 
price implies an increase in market power from January 2002 onwards.  
 
Given these rather ambiguous results, we maintained the multiplicative model (2). We used differ-
ent methods to further test the stability of our results: 
•  We estimated model (2) without the AR(1) term and analyzed the residual for stationarity to 
identify whether a co-integration approach is needed. The residual was clearly found to be sta-
tionary. 
•  As we are very much interested in the possibility of a structural break, we used the CHOW break-
point test on observation 84, which is December 2001. The result was negative. However, the 
CHOW forecast test for the year 2002 suggested a structural break, and in the 1995 – 2001 esti-
mation, the elasticity with respect to prices (absolutely) rose – a result already known from 
model (6). But this test is not very powerful given estimation over a period of only 12 months 
with three degrees of freedom. Thus, we remained with the methodology used in models (3) and 
(4). In these cases, the log-likelihood ratio test did not suggest any improvements
19. 
•  Because of the autoregressive structure, we tested a NERLOVE-type specification, i.e. lagged the 
endogenous, the quantity, by one period. This allowed us to distinguish between long-term and 
short-term elasticities. However, a test for missing lagged endogenous did not show signifi-
cance. 
 
5.5 Economic  Interpretation 
We conclude that demand elasticities with respect to prices are close to unity; for sure, quantities 
react with prices on the firm level. An elasticity of –0.7 implies that price strategies are meaningful 
– price increases lead to a slightly below-proportionate loss in volumes and thus to a small increase 
in income. Changes in competition regimes cannot be traced either as a structural break, a shift in 
price elasticities or a change of the isoelastic exogenous. Furthermore, demand “breathes” with con-
struction demand, and this also includes demand from German regions in the West. Finally, no sign 
of a structural break at the end of 2001 can be found.  
 
Figure 9 gives the plots of actual, fitted and residual values of model (2). We clearly see that the 
critical period of 2002 does not show any peculiarities. Our inability to capture a structural break 
implies that no change in market power can be traced over the period included, i.e. a persistence of 
the “transmission” between quantities, prices and industry performance even in periods of sharp 
price dives. Thus, we conclude that the price reductions due to of excess capacities and the slump in 
industry demand better explain the situation of 2002 than the dissolving of the cartel. Generally 








                                                 
19   In fact, the log-likelihood ratios were 0.007 for models (3) against (2) and 0.014 for models (4) against (2). As the 
forecast test estimates the sub-samples separately, it has less statistical power than the approach used here, i.e. test-
ing within the sample a structural break, splitting up a variable or enquiring into changes of functional form away 
from the isoelastic model.  24 
Figure 9: 
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6.  Excess Income and Profit 
6.1  The Legal Formulae 
The legal formulae of excess income and excess profit are based on the real quantities exchanged on 
the market (restricted by the cartel) and compare (supposedly lower) hypothetical prices and (sup-
posedly higher) cartel prices. This approach assumes that, because of market power, firms are able 
to extract higher prices than under “normal” conditions, i.e. the demand function under cartel condi-
tions dominates the competitive demand function
21. Furthermore, cost savings due to the existence 
of the cartel, such as reduced marketing efforts, must be accounted for, but alternative strategic op-
tions under competitive circumstances that would have reduced cost are not allowed to be included. 
The usual approach to quantify excess income would be by calculating deadweight loss, the LER-
NER Index (LERNER, 1934) or a combination of the two that also accounts for the cost structure 
(UTTON, 2003, p. 59 ff.). However, as elasticities of demand with respect to price were – in absolute 
terms – below unity in the time series, this is not possible. Classic monopoly or oligopoly theory 






                                                 
20   As the data set also includes other production units, X-Company data range from 97 to 192. 
21   See for a definition of excess income and profit: DANNECKER, BIERMANN (2001), Rz. 337; KLUSMANN, WIEDEMANN 
(1999), MEURER (1998), ERLINGHAGEN, ZIPPEL (1974). In fact, this formula is a rather close translation of what we 
describe with the term of “change in competition regime”. 
22  Elasticities above unity (in absolute terms) can be derived from a spatial model of cement demand (values range 
between -3.5 and -2.0, depending on model specification); see BLUM 2004b.   25 
6.2  Fundamental Theoretical Considerations 
Let us briefly summarize our main arguments on the competition structure: 
1.  Because of sunk costs, sustainable price systems that allow rents without market entry are pos-
sible. 
2.  Price differentiation is possible, in fact strong price discrimination can be observed because of 
transportation costs, which allow the delineation of individual markets (see 6.1). 
3.  If a quota agreement is effective – which we had trouble to show as structural breaks were both 
non-existent in the time-series and the regional cross-section analysis of cement demand – then 
we would assume that prices are higher for given quantities than under conditions of competi-
tion. This is exactly what the excess income formula supposes. This implies that, at given 
prices, increased quantities will be observed if a quota agreement has been effective
23. This is 
the argument of the GAA and can be represented as follows in the price-quantity-diagram of X-
Company in Figure 10. 
 
Figure 10: 









































What would happen if the reduced level of demand, as given above, is explained (or even under-
explained) by general economic development? This would imply that the “split”, in fact, did not 
exist, were only the consequence of different external conditions. Thus, only through a multivariate 
analysis can the question of whether this split exists be resolved. As the demand function estimated 
in the fifth chapter for the eight years from 1995 to 2002 includes, following the argument of the 
GAA, seven years of quota agreement (1995-2001) and one year of full competition (2002), it 
should be dominated by the cartel period and, thus, estimate a demand function that is “too high”. In 
fact, this is exactly what the “cartel dummy” tried to capture, namely a decreased level of demand 
in 2002 – which we were not able to identify on a statistically significant level. Figures 11 and 12 
identify reduced and excess revenues. 
                                                 
23   This is the complement of the argument that, through market power, firms were able to charge increased prices for 
given quantities.  26 
6.3 Excess  Income 
6.3.1 Ex-Post  Forecast 
This approach uses the elasticities computed in Model (2) of Table 4, the changes in the three stra-
tegic exogenous variables, prices, construction index, and the West-East Ratio, and compares the 
quantity change defined trough the model. It then compares it to the true volume change. In doing 
so, we use the results in a deterministic way, i.e. imply that they are “true”, because we do not ac-
count for confidence intervals. Table 5 contains the necessary data and results.  
 
Figure 11: 




































































































































  27 
The first group of data gives the index values of 2001, the second group of 2002 and the third group 
the changes. The fourth group contains the three elasticities, which are combined with their respec-
tive variables. We compute an explained change in volume of 0.08. The true quantity change, how-
ever, is 0.134 – which leaves 0.054 as unexplained rest. This implies, however, that the model un-





Price Index Level 2001 (1995=100) 100,54
Quantity Index Level 2001 (1995=100) 78,20
Construction Industry Index 2001 (1995=100) 67,08
West-East Index Ratio 2001 117,96
Price Index Level 2002 (1995=100) 75,50
Quantity Index Level 2002 (1995=100) 88,65
Construction Industry Index 2002 (1995=100) 58,63
West-East Index Ratio 2002  127,05
Price Change -0,249
Quantity Change 0,134
Construction Industry Index Change -0,126
West-East-Ratio 0,077
Elasticity of Demand with Respect to Prices -0,741
Elasticity of Demand with Respect to Industry 1,820
Elasticity of Demand with Respect to West-East 1,618
Explained Change of Quantity 0,080
Not Explained Change of Quantity 0,054
Computation of Excess Income (I)
 
 
6.3.2 Analysis  of  Residuals 
We compute the sum of residuals over the last 12 months of the sample, i.e. 2002, which should be 
negative, as we suspect that in this last year, in case of an excess income, actual values should lie 
below fitted values. As the function was estimated in a logarithmic form, this implies: 
 





where x is the real value of cement demand and x ˆ  the estimated (fitted) value. The effect, δ , of the 
residual with respect to a reference situation is 
 
(8)   ( ) δ
µ µ = ⋅ − = − ⋅ = − x e x e x x x 1 ˆ . 
 
In Table 6, we have included the residuals of 2002. We see that the sum is positive, which implies 
that over these 12 months actual values are above fitted values. This gives further evidence of re-





                                                 
24   Even if we push the elasticities to their limit of the 95% confidence interval, the reduced income will not vanish – 
but of course become very small.  28 
Table 6: 
Months Residuals
1 / 2002 -0,036
2 / 2002 0,175
3 / 2002 -0,051
4 / 2002 0,203
5 / 2002 0,063
6 / 2002 0,070
7 / 2002 -0,009
8 / 2002 -0,046
9 / 2002 -0,011
10 / 2002 -0,033
11 / 2002 -0,019
12 / 2002 -0,188
Sum of Residuals 0,1174
Average Sum of Residuals 0,0098
Index 2001 (1995=100) 113,37
Additional Index Points from Residuals -1,11
Computation of Excess Income (II)
 
 
In addition, we have plotted net prices over distance. Again we see an enormous variation over dis-
tance. If we take gross prices or take gross prices only until the year 2001, the general structure of 
Figure 9 remains unchanged. This shows us that X-Company actively uses price discrimination, for 
instance in order to meet import competition. 
6.4 Excess  Profit 
There is little evidence of excess profits if excess income cannot be found. It would imply that sav-
ings in certain cost categories, especially in marketing, etc., have been made. However, this would 
imply that the quota cartel showed a reasonable level of effectiveness. This is exactly what is cast 
into doubt through our econometric analysis, which did not reveal any significant change in the de-
mand function. Following our argument, we see 2002 as a shake-out period which still follows the 
general quantity-activity-price mechanisms. In fact, our model traces the fall in prices back to the 
attempt to keep production at sustainable levels by sacrificing prices in a period of very low con-
struction activity. This happens, in fact, at the expense of less competitive suppliers.  
 
Excess profit can emerge under situations of constant revenues under two additional conditions: 
1.  If reduced or increased volumes lead to falling unit costs depending on the technology used. The 
firm would then try to approach and then stick to its optimal production point under the situa-
tion of an efficient cartel. Given the de-facto variation of production over time in order to 
breathe with the market and rather constant price, X-company was never able to achieve such a 
goal. 
2.  Excess profit could be hidden in artificial costs, i.e. slack. But given the low price level com-
pared to other regions, it is more likely that X-company has less slack than competitors outside 
this market. 
 
7.  What Do We Learn? 
The GAA of Germany has fined the defendants € 661 million because of alleged excess revenues in 
all four markets of Germany. Its arguments rest on two central propositions: 
•  the existence of a credible comparative market period; 
•  a break in competition regime from increased market power until 2001 to decreased market 
power from 2002 onwards, which allowed excess revenues (relative to normal revenues) to be 
maintained in the first period.  29 
 
In our analysis, we first showed that 2002 is an inappropriate comparative market period for the 
cement industry, as it lacks a minimum level of stability – in particular its prices do not converge. 
We then proceeded and described a hypothetical competition structure. By using a time-series 
econometric model, we showed that a break in competition regime could not be identified. This 
implies that market power did not change from 2001 to 2002 – which it would have if a functioning 
cartel had existed before. Given the small evidence of excess profits, we even identified conditions 
for a reduced income, given the market structure of the “cartel period”. We saw evidence that the 
price dive of 2002 relates more to depressed market conditions and to the will to shake out excess 
capacity in the industry. However, driving out capacity in an already cleansed market could take 
some time. This implies – and here we fall back to the comparative market period – that more than a 
year might be needed for such a restructuring of the market which then, once prices have con-
verged, may be structurally too different to serve as a comparative market. Our analysis further 
points to the potentials of pursuing a “quantitative antitrust policy” in order to augment the rigor-
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